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BAUGHMAN V. BRADFORD COAL CO., INC.:
A REAFFIRMATION OF CITIZEN SUITS
POLICY WITHIN THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The legislative genesis of the Clean Air Act occurred in July,
1955, with the enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act, in
which Congress recognized the impending problem of air pollu-
tion in the United States and asked the states to become actively
involved in its prevention and control.1 In the ensuing 15 years
Congress passed several subsequent acts embodying the same
precepts contained in the initial Act.2 This succeeding legislation
recognized the exigency of air pollution control in the United
States and further suggested that the states take primary respon-
sibility for its eradication, with the federal government providing
research and financial aid. The Air Quality Act of 1967 also
granted the federal government limited supervisory authority,3 al-
though it did not alter the original federal policy of allowing vol-
untary participation by the states in air pollution containment."
Not until the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 did federal policy radically change.5 This Act commanded
the states to initiate comprehensive programs that included strin-
gent requirements. In addition, it required the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to define and pub-
lish national primary and secondary ambient air quality stan-
dards.6 It also ordered the states to draft State Implementation
Plans for the prevention and control of air pollution, to submit
these plans to the EPA for approval, and to begin enforcing the
' Clean Air Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
2 Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, § 1, 74 Stat. 162 (1960); Clean Air
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79
Stat. 992 (1965); Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954 (1966). See also Note, Federal
Clean Air Policy: Its Uncertain Foundations, 10 IND. L. REV. 931 (1977).
Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
See Note, Federal Clean Air Policy: Its Uncertain Foundations, 10 IND. L.
REv. 931, 944 (1977).
1 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), enacted Dec. 31, 1970, (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(2) (West 1976) and subsequently changed to 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1978) upon enactment of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977).
e 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a)(1) (West 1976). This section was subsequently
changed to 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp. 1978) upon enactment of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977.
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plans within a specified period of time.7
More importantly, the 1970 Act was embellished with a pro-
vision for citizen suits, which became profoundly significant in
the enforcement of these State Implementation Plans.8 The pur-
7 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (West 1976), which was subsequently changed to
42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West Supp. 1978) after enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. The 1977 Act did not alter 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (West
1976), which directed the states to submit implementation plans and authorized
the Administrator of the EPA to approve or reject those plans. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410
(West Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings,
adopt and submit to the Administrator, within nine months after the
promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality standard (or any
revision thereof) under section 7409 of this title for any air pollutant, a
plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement
of such primary standard in each air quality control region (or portion
thereof) within such State. In addition, such State shall adopt and sub-
mit to the Administrator (either as a part of a plan submitted under the
preceding sentence or separately) within nine months after the promul-
gation of a national ambient air quality secondary standard (or revision
thereof), a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement of such secondary standard in each air quality control re-
gion (or portion thereof) within such State ....
(a)(2) The Administrator shall, within four months after the date
required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disap-
prove such plan or each portion thereof....
8 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (West 1976), which subsequently was changed to 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West Supp. 1978), upon enactment of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977. This section also was left intact by the 1977 Act, which did not
modify the requirements for initiating citizen suits. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 reads in
relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permit-
ted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to
be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this
chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with re-
spect to such a standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which
is not discretionary with the Administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any
new or modified major emitting facility without a permit required under
part C or subchapter I of this chapter (relating to significant deteriora-
tion of air quality) or part D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to
[Vol. 82
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pose of this provision was two-fold: it widened citizen access to
the courts, enabling citizens to participate in the fight against air
pollution, which directly affects their health and safety; and it at-
tempted to motivate and goad the EPA and state agencies
charged with the responsibility of enforcing anti-pollution stat-
utes into appropriate action.9 Hence, the statute enabled individ-
ual citizens or groups, with or without standing to sue, to chal-
lenge governmental efforts or failures to manage or regulate the
environment and to sue private entities to enjoin them from con-
ducting polluting activities on any public or private property.
The 1970 Act remains the backbone of air pollution environ-
mental law. Congress has since enacted the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, but these Amendments only slightly modify the
1970 Act and revise none of the citizen suits provision.10
It is against this background that Baughman v. Bradford
Coal Co., Inc." entered the contemporary environmental litiga-
tion arena. On December 27, 1976, a group of residents of Bigler,
Pennsylvania, instituted an action under the citizen suits provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197012 against Bradford
Coal Company in the United States Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. Their complaint charged the
coal company with operating an excessively polluting coal
processing plant in violation of the Pennsylvania Implementation
Plan.' 3 The plan was enforceable by the state, the EPA, or the
nonattainment) or who is alleged to be in violation of any condition of
such permit.
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emis-
sion standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Adminis-
trator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be.
1 See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See
generally, DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative
Process, 2 DuKE L.J. 409 (1977); and Senator Muskie's comments at 116 CONG.
REc. 32,926 (1970).
10 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642
(West Supp. 1978)), which includes the entire Amendments.
11 592 F.2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1979).
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978). See note 8.
13 This implementation plan is codified at 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 4001-
4015 (Purdon Cum. Supp 1979). It was properly approved by the EPA.
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federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(1). 14 This
statute bestows subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal court,
obviating any need to invoke the traditional subject matter juris-
diction statutes. 15
The major controversy in the case arose because of the exis-
tence of another provision of the statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b). 16
Bradford maintained that this statute precluded the district court
from having subject matter jurisdiction. Part of the statute re-
quires a citizen to give the EPA, the state, and the alleged pol-
luter 60 days notice prior to actually filing suit in federal court.
1 7
This allows all parties an opportunity to rectify the problem and
avoid litigation. In this case the plaintiffs had complied with this
provision. However, another subsection in the statute prohibits
any citizen from filing suit in federal court if ". . . the Adminis-
trator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil action in a court of the United States or a State ..
Well before the plaintiffs filed their action, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) had commenced
an action against Bradford for the same alleged violations before
the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (Hearing Board)
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978). See note 8.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 1976) requires a federal question to exist. The
plaintiffs in Baughman could have availed themselves of this statute as well, since
the case arose under a federal statute. However, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp.
1979), requiring diversity of citizenship and a minimum amount in controversy,
would have been inapplicable.
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b) (West Supp. 1978) states in pertinent part:
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the vio-
lation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the violation
occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or
order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to
require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any
such action in a court of the United States any person may intervene as
a matter of right. . . (emphasis added).
17 Id. § 7604(b)(1)(A).
Is Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B). (emphasis added).
[Vol. 82
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pursuant to statutes in the Pennsylvania Implementation Plan.19
These statutes enabled the DER to issue orders and enforce the
state anti-pollution laws and authorized the Hearing Board to ad-
judicate disputes arising from the DER's activities."
Consequently, the issues before the district court were: (1)
whether the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board was a
"court" for the purposes of precluding the district court from
hearing the case by virtue of 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(B); 1 and
(2) whether the DER and the Hearing Board had "diligently
prosecuted" the action prior to the plaintiffs filing their suit.2 '
The district court ruled that the Hearing Board could not be a
"court" for the purpose of defeating the plaintiffs' action and de-
termined that both the DER and the Hearing Board had been
dilatory in their prosecution of Bradford's case. The court of ap-
peals upheld the decision.
There is a dearth of authority specifically construing the
term "court" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(B).' 3 In Baughman
the court of appeals recognized that generally the word "court" in
a statute refers to only "the tribunals of the judiciary and not to
19 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4004 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979) provides in
pertinent part:
The department [DER] shall have power and its duty shall be to-
(4.1) Issue orders to any person owing or operating an air contamina-
tion source, or owning or possessing land on which such source is lo-
cated, if such source is introducing or is likely to introduce air contami-
nants into the outdoor atmosphere in excess of any board rule or
regulation, or any permit requirement applicable to such source, or at
such a level so as to cause air pollution. . . . Within thirty (30) days
after service of any such order the person to whom the order is issued or
any other person aggrieved by such order may file with the hearing
board an appeal setting forth with particularity the grounds relied upon.
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979) states:
The hearing board shall have the power and its duty shall be to hear
and determine all appeals from orders issued by the department in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this act. Any and all action taken by the
hearing board with reference to any such appeal shall be in the form of
an adjudication and all such action shall be subject to the provisions of
the act of June 4, 1945 (P.L. 1388), known as the 'Administrative
Agency Law'.
20 Id.
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1978). See note 16.
22 Id.
23 Id.
1980]
5
Quick: Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc.: A Reaffirmation of Citizen S
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
those of an executive agency with quasi-judicial powers."'24 In
support of this premise the court cited cases that had not been
decided under the Clean Air Act, though the analysis of the vari-
ous courts in support of that general rule was convincing.25 In De-
partment of State v. Spano,26 the Pennsylvania Real Estate Com-
mission initiated an adjudicatory procedure against a real estate
broker for violation of a state statute prohibiting discriminatory
rental practices. Prior to the Commission bringing its action
against the broker, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis-
sion, another state agency, had conducted adjudicatory proceed-
ings against the broker and found him in violation of the human
relations statute. A provision of the Real Estate Brokers' License
Act authorized the State Real Estate Commission to revoke a
broker's license if found to have violated any provision of the
Act.217 The igsue in the case was whether the Human Relations
Commission was a "court of competent jurisdiction," thereby ena-
bling the State Real Estate Commission to utilize testimony from
the adjudication of the Human Relations Commission for the
purpose of removing the broker's license by statute. The Com-
monwealth court held it was not, mainly due to the lax eviden-
tiary requirements of an administrative agency, and reversed the
decision of the Real Estate Commission, declaring:
While many administrative agencies make decisions which are
judicial in nature ... we know of no authority, nor has any
been cited, that such power affords them the stature of a court.
Absent a clearly expressed contrary legislative intent to a dif-
ferent meaning, the word "court" as contained in a statute can
only mean one within the judicial structure of the government
592 F.2d at 217.
" United States v. Frantz, 220 F.2d 123, 125 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 954 (1955); Nelson v. Real Estate Commission, 35 Md. App. 334, 370 A.2d
608 (1977); Department of State v. Spano, 1 Pa. Commw. 240, 274 A.2d 563
(1971). In Frantz, a third circuit case, the court held that the word "court" in the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940 could not be construed to "include a head
of an executive department administratively determining excess profits on war
contracts .... ." 220 F.2d at 125. The court maintained that Congress had explic-
itly precluded that term from applying to governmental agencies by providing
that- "The term 'court', as used in this Act, shall include any court of competentjurisdiction of the United States or of any State, whether or not a court of re-
cord." Id.
1 Pa. Commw. at 240, 274 A.2d 563 (1971).
• Id. at 242, 274 A.2d at 565.
[Vol. 82
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or a judge thereof, and cannot include an agency of the execu-
tive branch simply because it possesses quasi-judicial powers.28
The court of appeals in Baughman also cited contrary au-
thority which demonstrated that the Pennsylvania Environmental
Hearing Board had been deemed a "court" for the purpose of re-
moval to federal court.29 The court rather cursorily dismissed this
authority, though, by determining that the purport of federal re-
moval statutes was significantly different than that of environ-
mental legislation. Such a distinction was unnecessary, however,
because close scrutiny of that apparently contrary authority
reveals no real conflict with the court of appeals' decision. In one
case, United States v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing
Board,30 the federal government allegedly violated the Penn-
sylvania Clean Stream Law and desired to remove the case from
the state agency to federal court. The removal was allowed. The
district court hearing the case held that the term "court" should
not be construed so narrowly as to defeat the utilization and ap-
plication of the federal removal statute and declared:3 1 "This [re-
moval] policy should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging in-
terpretation of § 1442(a)(1). '3 2
This rationale cuts both ways, however. If words in a statute
are not to be so myopically construed as to defeat federal policy,
then, likewise, they should not be so expansively construed as to.
run afoul of that same policy. Thus, because the policy considera-
tions of the Clean Air Act are of paramount importance, as will
be noted later, this type of analysis is in essence an endorsement
of the Baughman decision. Accordingly, the Baughman court had
no real need to make any distinction between removal and envi-
ronmental policy.
The most compelling case the court of appeals cited in sup-
28 Id. at 245, 274 A.2d at 566.
29 592 F.2d at 217-18, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the federal removal statute and
United States v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, 377 F. Supp. 545,
553 (M.D. Pa. 1974). See also, Volkswagon de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
Labor Relations Board, 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972), where the Labor Relations
Board was held to be a "court," since its broad discretionary authority and power
endowed it with sufficient characteristics to enable it to achieve statutory goals.
-0 377 F. Supp. 545 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
21 Id. at 553.
32 Id., the court citing Wellingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).
1980]
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port of its decision was Friends of the Earth v. Carey,"3 wherein
an environmental group filed suit against the State of New York
and its governor under the same citizen suits provision 'as in
Baughman."' The state had been recalcitrant in the enforcement
of its implementation plan. Part of this plan had been approved
by the EPA, but a portion had been rejected and sent back to the
state for revision. The complaint alleged that the state had failed
to enforce that portion of the plan which had been approved and
had been laggard in completing its revisions. The district court
refused to hear the case and dismissed the suit. It found that the
EPA was still reviewing part of the plan and was negotiating con-
sent orders with the state at the time of the suit. The court rea-
soned that the EPA was ultimately charged with enforcement of
the plan, and judicial review would amount to an intrusion into
the EPA's decision making processes and, hence, an usurpation of
its authority.35 The court of appeals reversed the decision and or-
dered the approved portion of the implementation plan immedi-
ately enforced. It also commanded the EPA to complete the por-
tion of the plan that it had rejected, using EPA guidelines. In
additionthe court announced that the district court had failed to
recognize and appreciate the import of citizen suits as counte-
nanced by Congress. 8 The court enunciated: ". .[T]he citizen
suits provision reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen
citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective assur-
ance that the Act would be implemented and enforced.
'8 7
Upon examining the legislative history, the Friends court de-
termined that Congress had been adamantly opposed to anything
13 535 F.2d 165 (2nd Cir. 1976).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West Supp. 1978), after the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977. See note 8.
31 See Note, Friends of the Earth v. Carey: Enforcing the Clean Air Act, 9
TRmsp. L.J. 411 (1977), for a more extensive study of the case.
38 535 F.2d at 172.
37 Id. See also, National Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692
(D.C. Cir. 1975), which the Baughman court cited along with Friends. See note 33.
In Train a citizen suit was initiated against the EPA to compel its Administrator
to publish and enforce guidelines required by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972. At issue was the propriety of the suit, because the envi-
ronmental group had failed to follow the appropriate statutory notice procedure.
The court upheld the citizen suit irrespective of that error.
[Vol. 82
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less than statutory restrictions placed on citizen suits:"8 "Govern-
ment initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act
has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for viola-
tions of standards should motivate governmental agencies
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abate-
ment proceedings ... "39
After assiduously studying the 1970 Act and its history, the
court also announced:
S.. [B]oth the underlying rationale and legislative history sur-
rounding the citizen suit provision demonstrate that Congress
intended the district court to enforce the mandated air quality
plan irrespective of the failings of agency participation. As
noted earlier, the very purpose of the citizens' liberal right of
action is to stir slumbering agencies and to circumvent bureau-
cratic inaction that interferes with the scheduled satisfaction
of the federal air quality goals.40
Though Friends does not specifically define the word "court"
for Baughman's purposes, it is important for two reasons. First,
the case demonstrates a willingness by federal courts to take an
air pollution dispute from the purview of the EPA or any state
agency if it appears that that agency is dilatory in its responsibil-
ity to the public. Though no specific "action" had been filed by
the EPA against the State of New York, thereby forcing the fed-
eral court to dismiss the" citizen suit if that agency was diligently
prosecuting the action, the language in the case manifests a desire
by the court timely to resolve air pollution disputes directly af-
fecting the public, regardless of whether the EPA or a state
agency is reviewing the problem, negotiating consent orders, or
doing anything less than "diligently prosecuting" the action. An-
other case decided under the citizen suits provision, National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,41 attests to this rationale.
In that case the federal court determined it had subject matter
jurisdiction even though the notice provision of 42 U.S.C.A. §
7604(b)(1)(A)42 had not been met. Second, the Friends court in-
terpreted and embraced the Congressional intent embodied in the
:8 Id.
9 Id., citing from S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970).
40 Id. at 173.
41 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1978). See note 16.
1980]
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legislative history, which manifests important policy deter-
minations.
The Baughman court cited part of the legislative history of
the 1970 Act in its majority opinion. 4 3 A closer examination of the
history reveals the fervor with which Congress championed the
citizen suits provision.4 4 Jn one debate, Senator Muskie re-
sponded to a charge by Senator Hruska that the provision would
overburden the federal courts and paralyze appropriate regula-
tpry agencies.4 Senator Muskie remarked that the provision re-
quired an individual or group to give 60 days' notice to the EPA,
state agency, and the alleged violator prior to filing suit, and then
stressed that if the problem had not been addressed and appro-
priate action taken within 60 days, the agency deserved to relin-
quish the case to the federal courts.4 e Reading from the record of
the Senate Committee on Public Works, he announced:
It should be emphasized that if the agency had not initiated
abatement proceedings following notice or if the citizen be-
lieved efforts initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citi-
zen might choose to file the action. In such case, the courts
would be expected to consider the petition against the back-
ground of the agency action and could determine that such ac-
tion would be adequate to justify suspension, dismissal, or con-
solidation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the
court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have
jurisdiction to consider the citizen action notwithstanding
any pending agency action.47
Obviously, in light of this language, the proponents of the
legislation did not intend an administrative agency to be a
"court" for the purposes of defeating citizen suits under 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604.48 By bestowing such broad discretionary author-
ity upon federal courts, Congress essentially stated that an agency
does not have the same status and authority as a "court" under
43 592 F.2d at 218.
" 116 CONG. REC. 32,900-928 (1970). This is the reference to the Senate de-
bate of September 21, 1970, concerning passage of the proposed National Air
Quality Standards Act of 1970, which ultimately was enacted as part of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970.
4z Id. at 32,925.
" Id. at 32,926-27.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
4- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 82
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the Clean Air Act.
The holdings in the previously discussed cases, coupled with
this legislative history, afforded the Baughman court sufficient
authority to decide this first issue. Going further, however, the
court determined that before an agency can be a "court" under
the citizen suits provision, it must be "empowered to grant relief
which will provide meaningful and effective enforcement of an
implementation plan. ' 49 It reasoned that since the EPA was able
to provide injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413,5
whereas the Hearing Board was not,5 the EPA may be justified
in being a "court", but the Hearing Board may not.52 The court
also pointed out that the EPA was able to recover civil penalties
of up to $25,000 a day for continuing violations after an injunc-
tion has been issued, 53 yet the Hearing Board was only able to
assess penalties of up to $2,500 a day.54 Considering the authority
the Baughman court had before it, this argument seems not only
unnecessary but somewhat dubious as well, since the court failed
to cite any authority to support its reasoning.
The court of appeals' determination of the second issue solid-
ified its decision. From every indication the Hearing Board and
the DER had not been "diligently prosecuting" Bradford's alleged
violations. Since the citizens had complied with the notice re-
49 592 F.2d at 218.
50 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West Supp. 1978), provides in pertinent part:
(b) The Administrator shall, in the case of any person which is the
owner or operator of a major stationary source, and may, in the case of
any other person, commence a civil action for a permanent or temporary
injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty of not more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or both....
51 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4009.1 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute
enables the Hearing Board to assess civil penalties against a violator of the state
pollution laws. The Hearing Board may level a maximum penalty of $10,000
against the violator and fine him up to $2,500 a day for continued violations after
an order has been issued; but the statute does not confer authority upon the Hear-
ing Board to grant injunctive relief. However, a separate statute enables the DER
to obtain injunctive relief from the state Attorney General.
:2 592 F.2d at 218.
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West Supp. 1978).
54 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4009.1 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979); 42 U.S.C.A. §
7413(b)(West Supp. 1978). See note 50 for pertinent quote from the federal
statute.
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quirements,55 the DER and the Hearing Board had at least 60
days to make Bradford rectify the problem or at least take appro-
priate action to appease the citizens. Also, the DER had initiated
its own action well before the notification by the plaintiffs, so that
agency had ample time to initiate abatement proceedings or ob-
tain an injunction against Bradford from the state Attorney Gen-
eral pursuant to statute.5 6 Both agencies had failed to resolve the
problem internally or within the state court system.
More significantly, subsequent to the filing of the plaintiffs'
suit, the DER and Bradford agreed to pay the State of Penn-
sylvania $10,000 for past violations and to construct a new
processing plant by December 31, 1979. The DER consented to
allow Bradford to continue operating its plant provided it "take
all reasonable interim measures at the existing site to keep fugi-
tive emissions to a minimum (albeit, apparently, in excess of Plan
levels). '57 This order was not submitted to the EPA for approval
as required by statute.8 Collectively, these factors constitute
flagrant inertness and a lack of good faith on the part of the
DER, and substantiate the court's finding that the agencies in-
deed acted in less than diligent fashion.
Consequently, the court's judgment in Baughman was sound
and furthered Clean Air Act policies and objectives. It appears
the federal courts are still willing to uphold the ideals and objec-
tives of the 1970 Act, unless in doing so the harm would clearly
outweigh the benefit. Obviously, in Baughman this was not the
case. Had the court ruled differently, the Hearing Board more
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1978). See note 16.
"35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4010 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979), reads in rele-
vant part:
In addition to any other remedies provided for in this act, the Attorney
General, at the request of the department, may initiate, in the Common-
wealth Court or the court of common pleas of the county in which the
defendant resides or has his place of business, an action in equity for an
injunction to restrain any and all violations of this act or the rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder, or to restrain any public nuisance or
detriment to health caused by air pollution. ...
57 592 F.2d at 217.
5" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(5)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 1978). Variances from an imple-
mentation plan granted by a state are not effective until approved by the EPA.
See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976). See text accompa-
nying notes 33 and 34.
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than likely would have felt vindicated and more autonomous. In
addition, Bradford would have continued to keep the DER at bay
by paying minimal fines and making hollow promises. In the
meantime, Bradford's coal processing plant would have continued
to spew forth its pollutants upon the inhabitants of Bigler, Penn-
sylvania, who would have reconciled themselves to their insalu-
brity while cursing their legal impotence.
Hunter C. Quick
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